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I.

INTRODUCTION

Employment litigation, especially wrongful termination lawsuits,
are burgeoning in California as well as many other jurisdictions.
Employees from Mom and Pop grocery stores to multi-national
corporations are suing their employers for perceived wrongdoings
that commence from the date of their hire until the date of their
fire. Just as these lawsuits have flourished, so has the practice of
naming individual defendants, whether they are agents, employees,
officers, or directors, as named defendants in the complaints. This
practice, combined with the recent legislation in California, has
created new and resurrected old issues for attorneys.
Plaintiff attorneys who plead causes of action against individual
defendants, like managers and supervisors, can gain tactical advantages not present in the more traditional employment litigation where
employees sue their employers. The advantages that inure to plaintiffs
include destroying diversity if the individual defendant is domiciled
in the same state as the employee;' making the individual defendants
1. This advantage may be superfluous in light of Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., where the
court held that the presence of Doe defendants under California Doe defendant law destroys
diversity. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1987). Since all that is
necessary to defeat diversity is to plead Doe defendants, this particular advantage attributed
to naming individuals as defendants may be illusory.
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more accessible during discovery; creating possible conflicts of interest
that can be exploited; bringing into the lawsuit possible insurance
coverage; 2 and placing personal liability on the individual defendants
to bring additional pressure upon the employer to resolve the conflict. 3
When an individual defendant is named in a complaint, there are
many considerations that a defense attorney must discuss with the
individual and the corporate employers. The spectrum of issues spans
from the retention of counsel through the trial or settlement of the
case. Hence, in representing an individual defendant, the specific
procedures outlined in the Conclusion section of this article should
be followed.
The first part of this article discusses 'California's requirements for
a written fee agreement between attorneys and their clients and the
application of this statute to cases involving individually named
defendants and corporate defendants. The second part explores the
history of conflict of interest issues among multiple defendants
represented by one attorney. The third section briefly examines
potential coverage in certain insurance policies when an individual
defendant is named in the complaint. The fourth section outlines
potential procedural defenses and discovery strategies that might
apply when individual defendants are named in employment litigation
complaints. The fifth section of this article discusses corporate liability when an individual settles out of a lawsuit. The sixth part of
the article concentrates on indemnification issues between employees
and their employers. The article then turns to the issue of whether
multiple defendants are entitled to contribution. This article concludes
with a description of certain procedures to be followed when individual defendants are named in employment litigation complaints.
II.

WRITTEN FEE AGREEMENT

4

California Business And Professions Code section 6148 requires a
written fee agreement if it is reasonably foreseeable that total expense

2. There is a trend in California courts to deny insurance coverage for wrongful
termination causes of action. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal.
App. 3d 1205, 242 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1987). Even if this trend continues, coverage may exist
under other policies. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
3. Blum & Sargoy, Intentional Interference With Contractual Relations: When Are
Managers Liable For Terminating Employees? 6 CAL. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.Q. 11 (1988).
4. See CAL. LAW., Sept. 1987, at 93 (providing a more in-depth analysis of sample fee
agreements for litigation and non-litigation).
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to the client will exceed one thousand dollars.' According to section
6148, the fee agreement must be in writing and must contain the
following provisions:
1. The hourly rate and other standard rates, fees, and charges
applicable to the case;
2. the general nature of the legal services to be provided to the
client; and
3. the respective responsibilities of the attorney and the client as to
the performance of the contract.
If a lawyer fails to comply with the statute, the fee arrangement
becomes voidable at the client's option, and the lawyer will be limited
to a "reasonable" fee.
The statute also requires lawyers to provide their clients with written
billing statements. The client may demand such statements at minimum
intervals of thirty days. The lawyer must provide a statement within
ten days after demand. All statements, whether requested by the client
or not, must state the amount, rate, and basis for calculation or other
method of determination of the lawyer's fees.
In certain circumstances, the statute specifically exempts attorneys
from the written fee agreement requirement. These exemptions fall
into four categories:
1. Emergency services;
2. when services are the same general kind as previously rendered
to and paid for by the client;
3. when the client knowingly states in writing, after full disclosure
of this section, that a writing concerning fees is not required; and
4. when the client is a corporation.
Thus, if an attorney represents an individual because of an emergency, or if he6 represented an individual in the same type of litigation
previously, a written fee agreement is probably unnecessary. While
employment law attorneys typically have a continuing relationship with
their corporate clients through various types of employment related
litigation, such as discrimination and wrongful termination lawsuits,
rarely do they forge continuing legal relationships with individual
employees. Thus, the recommended approach is to obtain the client's
waiver of the written fee agreement upon retention by the client.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6148 (West 1974 & Supp. 1988).
6. By use of words in the masculine gender, the author intends to include the feminine
gender and intends no offense. The purpose of this usage is to be consistent with quotations
from statutes and cases.
5.
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Simultaneously, before undertaking a defense, attorneys should obtain
waivers of conflicts of interest if a potential for one exists. 7
III.

A.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

If A Potential Conflict Exists, The Attorney Must Obtain A
Written Waiver From All Clients

Whenever multiple clients are represented by one counsel, there
always exists the possibility, however remote, of a conflict of interest
arising between the parties. An actual conflict rarely exists when the
litigation commences. In Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc.,8 the court held
that prior to an adjudication that the corporation is entitled to relief
against its officers, or directors, the same attorney may represent
both. 9 While there is little doubt that a law firm can represent both
the individual defendants and the corporation for which they work,
if a conflict arises, it usually arises in the middle of the litigation. 0
For example, while at the outset of litigation both the corporation
and the individually named employee usually prefer to present a united
defense against the plaintiff, as facts are discovered sometimes the
corporation will assert that the individual was acting outside the scope
of his employment; therefore, the corporation should not be held
liable. This raises the question whether counsel can continue to represent the parties or must withdraw from representing one or both."
7. It is advisable to telephone clients and carefully explain the written fee agreement
requirements before any correspondence is sent to the client. This procedure would be equally
applicable to the conflict of interest letters and the waiver of the undertaking requirement
letter contained in Appendices C, D, and G. Two sample agreements can be found in
Appendices A and B. The first sample, in Appendix A, is a copy of a sample fee agreement
letter approved by the Board of Governors of the State Bar. The second sample, in Appendix
B, is a sample waiver of a written fee agreement.
8. 243 Cal. App. 2d 1, 52 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1968).
9. Jacuzzi, 243 Cal. App. 2d at 36, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
10. Rule 4-101 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney
from taking on employment of adverse interests unless there is a written consent between the
parties waiving all conflicts of interest. Thus, in the rare instance where an actual conflict of
interest exists before counsel undertakes the representation of either party, the California Rules
of Professional Conduct permit dual representation if both parties in writing waive the conflict.
CAL. RULES OF PROESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-101 (1988). Ultimately, however, despite the
written waiver, counsel would have to withdraw from representing both clients. See infra text
accompanying notes 18-20. Consequently, if an actual conflict exists before representation is
undertaken for either party, counsel should only represent one of the parties.
11. Rule 2-111(B) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct states that an attorney
must withdraw from representing a client if "[hie knows or should know that his continued
employment will result in violation of these Rules of Professional Conduct or of the State Bar
Act." CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 2-111(B) (2) (1988).
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Rule 5-102(B) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct
resolves this question by providing that if a conflict of interest arises
while representing different parties, the attorney must obtain a written
consent waiving all conflicts between the parties to continue representation of all parties.' 2 Thus, it would appear that even if there is a
conflict of interest, an attorney may continue to represent all parties
upon obtaining informed written consent 3 waiving all conflicts from
all parties concerned.
Furthermore, according to Klemm v. Superior Court,'4 if only a
potential for conflict exists, the attorney may represent both. In Klemm
a husband and wife sought a writ of mandate to permit joint representation with respect to a child support and dissolution proceeding.
The court held that with full disclosure to and informed consent of
both clients, an attorney can represent more than one party even if a
potential conflict of interest exists.' 5 Failure to disclose a potential
conflict of interest exposes an attorney to civil liability to a client who
suffers damages caused by the failure to disclose, and in addition,
introduces the specter of malpractice.' 6 Consequently, if there exists a
possibility for a conflict of 7interest, written consent must be obtained
from all parties concerned.'

12. Id., Rule 5-102(B).
13. See Civil Ser. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 70, 82, 209 Cal. Rptr,
159, 168 (1985). "For the client's consent to be informed, the attorney must 'make a full
disclosure of all facts and circumstances' relevant to the conflict, 'including the areas of
potential conflict and the possibility and desirability of seeking independent legal advice."' Id.
14. 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977).
15. The court specifically held:
Though an informed consent be obtained, no case we have been able to find
sanctions dual representation of conflicting interests if that representation is in
conjunction with a trial or hearing where there is an actual, present, existing conflict
and the discharge of duty to one client conflicts with the duty to another....
However, if the conflict is merely potential, there being no existing dispute or contest
between the parties represented as to any point in litigation, then with full disclosure
to and informed consent of both clients there may be dual representation at a
hearing or trial.
Klemm, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 898-99, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (citations omitted). See also Burum
v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 30 Cal. 2d 575, 584, 184 P.2d 505, 510 (1947) (the mere possibility
of a conflict of interest between a defendant and her insurance company does not invalidate
a contract between an attorney and that defendant); Cable Oakland v. Wilson, 201 Cal. App.
3d 530, 536, 247 Cal. Rptr. 778, 783 (1988) (rule 5-102 requires an attorney to obtain the
informed written consent of his client before undertaking any representation which involves
even a potential conflict of interest).
16. Klemm, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 901, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 514. See also Purdy v. Pacific
Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 77, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534 (1984) (if attorney does not
withdraw or make full disclosure to both clients in the event of a conflict, the attorney risks
exposure to liability for harm resulting from his failure as well as a charge of professional
misconduct).
17. Klemm, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 900, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 513. See Civil Ser. Comm'n v.
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B. If An Actual Conflict Occurs, An Attorney Must Withdraw
From Representing All Clients
An actual conflict of interest may arise in the context of employment
litigation when, for example, an individually named defendant, such
as a manager, defames the terminated employee while responding to
a request for a reference. If an actual conflict occurs during the
litigation, the question arises whether an attorney must withdraw from
representing both clients or may continue representing one of the
parties.'
California Appellate courts are split on this question. One view is
that the attorney may continue to represent one party but must
withdraw from representation of the other. That view is explained in
Pennix v. Winton, 9 an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff while
riding as a guest in defendant's automobile. The attorney, hired by
an insurance company to represent the defendant, argued in court that
the plaintiff and defendant were acting in collusion. While this argument furthered the insurance company's interests, it was detrimental
to the defendant's position. The court concluded that when the attorney's representation of the insurance carrier conflicted with the attorney's representation of the individual defendant, the attorney was
required to withdraw from representing the individual, but was permitted to continue his representation of the insurance carrier.

Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 70, 82, 209 Cal. Rptr. 159, 168 (1985) (an attorney must
obtain informed written consent of clients before undertaking any representation that involves
even a potential conflict of interest); Valley Title Co. v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 643
(1981) (writ of mandate was issued for purpose of determining validity of order disqualifying
attorney and his law firm from representing client). Pursuant to California Rules of Court
sections 976(b) and 976.1, the California Supreme Court has ordered the Valley Title Co.
opinion depublished. Cal. R. Ct. 976(b), 976.1 (West Supp. 1988). As a result, the case cannot
be cited as authority in the California courts. Id. The court in dicta discussed Klemm's analysis
of potential conflicts and noted, "Even in such a case, according to Rule 5-102, Rules of
Professional Conduct, the consent of the client must be in writing." Valley Title Co. 177 Cal.
Rptr. at 651. See infra appendices C and D, respectively, for sample waivers of potential
conflicts of interest.
18. In Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968), the court
noted that a number of cases have held that an attorney should withdraw when a conflict
arises between two clients, but the court ignored this precedent and held an attorney may
represent dual interests as long as full consent and full disclosure occur. Id. at 146-47, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 413-14. Since it is almost impossible to advocate the interests of each client when
their interests conflict, and because a lawyer owes undivided loyalty to his client and that
loyalty cannot consume that owed to another client, Lysick should not be followed. See
Ishmael v. Milligton, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-96 (1966).
19. 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 143 P.2d 940 (1943).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
While Pennix suggests that the attorney can continue representing
one of the parties, the better view is stated in Klemm. There, the
court held that if an actual conflict develops between parties, the

attorney would be disqualified from representing either at a contested

hearing. 20 The reasoning for not allowing the attorney to continue to

represent at least one of the parties is that an attorney has to maintain
the confidence of each of the parties and this duty would preclude
2
representing either party. '
Unfortunately, Valley Title v. Superior Court,- the case most di-

rectly on point, has been withdrawn. Nevertheless, since the opinion
relies to a large extent on Klemm, the reasoning in Valley Title is still
compelling. In Valley Title, an employee and a company were parties

to 30 or 40 lawsuits seeking damages for fraud. The company and
the employee had the same attorney. In a letter agreement signed by

the employee, the lawyer, upon appearance of a conflict of interest,
was permitted to withdraw as counsel upon fifteen days notification
to the employee. Three years after the commencement of litigation,
the attorney withdrew from representing the employee because a
conflict of interest had arisen. The court, in discussing the employee's

motion to disqualify the attorney from representing Valley Title, noted
that the most important feature of the disqualification rule is the

preservation of secrets and confidences communicated to the attorney
by a client. The court added that the possibility of a breach of

confidence, not the fact of such a breach, triggers disqualification.
The court ultimately granted the motion to disqualify the attorney

from representing the corporation. Because a confidence could be
breached by representing one client, the attorney's withdrawal was
mandatory. 23

20. Klemm, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 899-900, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
21. Id.
22. 177 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1981). See supra note 17 (discussing Valley Title Co.).
23. The court specifically held:
Perhaps the most important facet of the professional relationship served by this rule
of disqualification is the preservation of secrets and confidences communicated to
the lawyer by the client. If there is a reasonable probability that confidences were
disclosed which could be used against the client in later, adverse representation, a
substantial relation between the two cases is presumed ....
From this standpoint it
matters not whether confidences were in fact imparted to the lawyer by the client.
The substantial relationship between the two representations is itself sufficient to
disqualify. . . . The test does not require the former client to show that actual
confidences were disclosed.... It is the possibility of the breach of confidence, not
the fact of the breach, that triggers disqualification....
Valley Title Co. v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 643, 649-650 (1981) (citation omitted). See
also Cable Oakland v. Wilson, 201 Cal. App. 3d 530, 538, 247 Cal. Rptr. 778, 783 (1988)
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The above cases are applicable to employment litigation. If no actual
conflict exists, such as when the board of directors of a corporation
orders an officer to discharge an employee, then an attorney can
continue to represent both the corporation and the individual. Once
an actual conflict of interest arises, as when the officer racially slurs

the terminated employee during an exit interview or at some later
point, then the attorney must withdraw from representing both the
corporation and the individual. In sum, if no actual conflict exists,
then an attorney can represent both the corporation and any individually-named defendant if the attorney obtains written consent from
both parties. Once an actual conflict of interest arises, however, the
attorney must withdraw from representing both parties.
IV.

INSURANCE RAMIFICATIONS 24

In most wrongful discharge cases that allege tort causes of action,
it is common to tender to insurance companies for the cost of defense
and for indemnity under the following types of insurance policies:
1.
2.
3.

Comprehensive General Liability Policy;
Professional Liability Policy ("Errors and Omissions" Policy);
Employer's Liability and Workers' Compensation Policy; and

4.

Umbrella and/or Excess Policy.

When individuals are also named in the action, two other types of
policies should also be tendered to for the costs of defense and
indemnity: Directors and Officers Liability Policy ("D & 0'")25 and
Homeowner's Policy. A typical D & 0 policy insures against losses

(even though there was no showing of actual misappropriation of privleged information, the
spectre of potential abuse of trust and confidences remains); Global Van Lines v. Superior
Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d 483, 192 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1983) (attorney's knowledge of confidential
information presumed when he represented former client); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th
Cir. 1980) (it is the possibility of the breach of confidence, not the fact of the breach, that
triggers disqualification); Bloom, Ethical Dilemmas In Corporate Representation, 10 L.A.
LAW., March 1987 at 18 (discussing the interrelationship between breaches of confidences and
secrets and resulting conflicts of interest between employees and their corporate employers).
24. A comprehensive discussion of insurance concerns in employment litigation is beyond
the scope of this article. For an overview of those issues see Holmes, Insurance Coveragefor
Claims of Wrongful Employment Termination, 91 DICK. L. REv. 895 (1987); Peer & Mallen,
Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Termination Actions, DEE.
CoUNs. J., Oct. 1987, at 464; Peer & Mallen, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination And Wrongful Termination Actions, DEF. COUN. J. Jan. 1988, at 12.
25. This is the type of insurance alluded to in California Corporations Code section 317(i)
that insures a corporate official for acts for which a corporation may not normally indemnify
the official. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(i) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988). See also infra note 65
and accompanying text.
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arising from the wrongful acts of corporate officials. Such policies
usually insure individual directors and officers only. A covered loss
is, in most insurance policies by definition, an amount that the insured
is legally obligated to pay that is not indemnified by the corporation.
Because D & 0 policies generally provide only indemnity against loss
and not against liability, the insurer does not have a duty to defend
any action that alleges a potentially covered claim. The insurer's
underlying liability occurs
obligation to pay legal expenses and the
26
established.
been
has
only when liability
If an individual is not a director or officer, potential coverage may
be found in the individual defendant's homeowner's policy. Homeowner's policies typically cover both bodily injury and property damages resulting from an accidental occurrence. Thus, if a termination
is expected or intended by the insured, the homeowner's policy may
not cover the individual. Moreover, most homeowner's policies include
an exclusion for acts arising out of business pursuits. Since a wrongful
discharge claim arises out of the insured's employment relationship,
and that relationship is incidental to the insured's trade, profession,
or occupation, the claim probably arises from the insured's business
pursuit. If, however, the claim is incident to a nonbusiness pursuit,
the potential for coverage exists. 27 In any event, the exclusion may be
sufficiently ambiguous to preclude the insurer from denying a defense;
consequently, this policy is ripe for tendering.28
In addition to determining what insurance coverage is available and
whether the insurer will be obligated to defend, several defense strategies should be considered when an attorney receives an employment
litigation complaint. These strategies are discussed in the next section.
V.

DEFENSE STRATEGIES IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION WHEN

INDiVIDuALs ARE NAMED DEFENDANTS

When individuals are named as defendants in a lawsuit, a common
defense strategy is to file a demurrer to eliminate them from the
lawsuit. There are several theories supporting demurrers against indi-

26. Holmes, supra note 24, at 911.
27. Id.
28. The option to tender a claim to various insurance policies is a decision that the client
should make, especially with regard to tendering to individual homeowner policies. Clients
must weigh the advantage of insurance companies paying for a defense and potentially
contributing toward a settlement versus the likely increase in premiums. For a sample tender
letter to an insurance agent see Appendix E.

302
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vidual defendants. One defense arises from California Civil Code
section 2343, which provides that an agent cannot be held personally
liable for a breach of contract when acting in the course of the
agency. 29 Under Civil Code section 2343, an agent who enters into a
written contract in the name of his corporate employer principal, and
who believes in good faith that he has authority to do so, is protected
from individual liability in a breach of contract lawsuit. In Oppenheimer v. General Cable Corp.,3° the court in analyzing section 2343
noted, "Any breach of contract that is alleged in the complaint is
that of the corporation and not of its agents, and they are not
personally liable by reason thereof."' a3 Accordingly, when a cause of
action for wrongful discharge is essentially a contract action, an
individual defendant should be protected from any breach of contract
claim.
Likewise, there is authority that a person cannot be individually
liable in a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. In Scopas v. Armstrong World Industries,
Inc. ,32 the court extended the logic of Oppenheimer to dismiss an
individual defendant for a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing cause of action.3 3 Thus, it appears that individually named defendants can be dismissed from breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing causes
of action.
Civil Code section 2343 does not protect an individual from a pure
tort cause of action; consequently, an individual defendant normally
cannot be dismissed from a cause of action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy or for other attendant tort causes of action
to a wrongful discharge claim. Although section 2343 does not generally protect an individual from a tort cause of action, there is

29.
30.
31.
32.

Cal. Civ. Code § 2343 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
143 Cal. App. 2d 293, 300 P.2d 151 (1956).
Oppenheimer, 143 Cal. App. 2d at 297, 300 P.2d at 154.
114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2933 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd mem., 770 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.

1985).
33. The court specifically held:
Plaintiff contends that she properly joins Underwood as defendant because, as
"supervisory manager" of Armstrong, he violated the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by wrongly terminating her. The law is settled, however, that
co-employees cannot be held accountable for the employer's breach of this impliedin-law covenant.... Underwood was not a party to the oral employment agreement
between plaintiff and Armstrong, and thus was "not subject to the implied duty
arising from the contractual relationship .. "
Scopas, 114 L.R.R.M. at 2934 (citations omitted).
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authority that an individual acting within the scope of authority is
shielded from liability for the tort of wrongful interference with
4
contractual relations by the privilege of "managerial immunity.' '
The Ninth Circuit utilized the managerial immunity privilege in
dismissing individually named defendants from a complaint alleging
tortious conduct. In McCabe v. General Foods Corp.," the plaintiff
alleged causes of action for wrongful discharge, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and fraud and deceit. On the basis of the
complaint alone, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court properly
dismissed the two individuals. The court specifically held:
Their actions, according to the complaint, had been in their managerial capacity. Their actions, according to the complaint, had been
ratified by General Foods. They were not alleged to have acted on
their own initiative. McCabe's own declaration alleged that they were
motivated "in part" by ill will. But it is clear that "if an advisor is
motivated in part by a desire to benefit his principal," his conduct
is, under California law, privileged. Under California law no wrongful
36
discharge case was stated against them.
Consequently, pre-trial motions should be used to dismiss individually
named defendants from wrongful discharge causes of action.
Besides pre-trial motions, another defense consideration when individual defendants are named in a complaint is the impact on discovery.
California Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030(c)(1) and 2033(c)(1)
place a limit on the amount of interrogatories and requests for
admissions that one party can propound to another.37 Multiple defendants create a strategic advantage in discovery in that the interrogatory
and request for admissions limitations imposed by the Civil Procedure
Code can be expanded by having each defendant propound its own
set of discovery requests. This advantage, however, is minimal in light

34. See Becket v. Welton & Associates, 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1974)
(the immunity of a corporate officer from liability for the tort of inducing a breach of contract
is referred to as the "manager's privilege").
35. 811 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1987).
36. McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339 (citations omitted) (citing Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v.
Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1982). While the plaintiff alleged numerous other actions,
those actions were either dismissed because of deficient pleadings or because any negligence
against individually named defendants was not established because no duty was alleged against
individually named defendants in the complaint. Cf. Clement v. American Greetings Corp.,
636 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Cal. 1986), where the court held that actions for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, age discrimination, defamation,
and fraud alleged against individuals can be dismissed against them if the alleged wrong is
committed in the course and scope of their relationship to the corporation; in such situations
liability rests, if at all, on the corporation and not on the individuals.
37. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2030(c)(1); 2033(c)(1) (West 1988).
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of California Civil Procedure Code sections 2030(c)(2) and 2033(c)(2),
which permit a party to expand the amount of interrogatories and
requests for admissions by merely attaching a declaration to the
discovery request.
While the expanded discovery procedures promulgated by the Code
can be avoided by a protective order, the advantages inherent whenever
an individual defendant is named in a complaint cannot be abridged.
Thus, if defendants need to expand their discovery rights, the recommended approach is to have each defendant propound its own
discovery to the plaintiff instead of utilizing a joint discovery effort.
Each of these defense strategies should be examined thoroughly
before the attorney takes any action. The attorney who represents
both the individual and the corporation must also be prepared for the
liability remaining after the individual defendant reaches a settlement.

VI.

REMAIING CoRpoRATE LABILITY AFTER
AN INDIVIDUAL SETTLES

When an individual defendant settles, the question arises whether
an action survives against a corporate defendant whose liability is
predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior. In Ritter v. Technicolor, Inc.,38 the plaintiff sought to recover both from a corporation
and individuals for alleged false representations that induced him to
enter into a film distribution contract. The court concluded, "We find
inescapable the conclusion that under [Civil Procedure Code] section
877, the liability of a principal for the tortious acts of his agent, even
though wholly vicarious, survives release of the agent." 9
In Mayhugh v. County of Orange,4° the court added that the
enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.641 did not overturn
or modify Ritter. A release or settlement with an employee will not
release the employer. 42 Consequently, if an individual defendant settles,

38. 27 Cal. App. 3d 152, 103 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1972).
39. Ritter, 27 Cal. App. 3d, at 154, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
40. 141 Cal. App. 3d 763, 190 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1983).
41. CAL. CrV. PRoc. CODE § 877.6 (West 1988).
42. The court specifically held:
The legislature, in enacting section 877.6, did not overturn or modify Ritter. The
overall policy previously expressed by statute necessitates we recognize a release or
settlement with the employee does not release the employer. The addition of Section
877.6 was not intended to modify the rights of plaintiffs and tortfeasors who may
be jointly liable. ...
Mayhugh, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 766, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39.
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but a corporate defendant does not and is only vicariously liable based
on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the action would continue
against the corporation.
VII.

INDEMNIFICATION

A person or entity vicariously liable for a tort is usually entitled to
indemnity from the person primarily liable. Indemnity, which imposes
the entire loss on one of two or more tortfeasors, is distinct from
contribution, which distributes the loss equally among them. 43 There
are five different types of indemnity: (1) Express Contractual Indemnity, (2) Implied Contractual Indemnity, (3) Noncontractual Implied
Indemnity, (4) Indemnity Mandated By Law, and (5) Comparative
Equitable Indemnity.
An express contract for indemnity is best exemplified by an insurance
policy. An insurance policy is an express agreement whereby one party,
the insurer, agrees to indemnify the other party, the insured, for
specific types of losses set forth in the agreement. Some contracts do
not contain express indemnity provisions; nevertheless, indemnity may
be implied in certain factual situations. For example, when there exists
a duty to perform work safely, negligent performance of such work
constitutes a breach of this duty and gives rise to a right to implied
44
contractual indemnity.
Noncontractual implied indemnity arises only absent contractual
indemnity. Such a claim must rest on a showing that the potential
indemnitor, such as an employee, owed the claiming indemnitee, such
as the employer, a duty and that the indemnitee did not participate
in the wrong. The obligation to indemnify in this circumstance arises
because of a special relationship between the indemnitee and the
indemnitor (for example, employer held vicariously liable for the torts
of his servant). Indemnity also can arise from statutory provisions
mandating indemnity, such as California Labor Code section 2802. 41
Finally, concurrent tortfeasors can obtain equitable indemnity from
other concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis when a

43. 4 B. WVnKIN, SU
Y OF CAtMFoRNiU LAW § 50 (8th ed. 1974). See Appendix F for
a comparison of indemnification and contribution rights.
44. For a more in-depth discussion of indemnification rights see Daniels, Substantive and
ProceduralAspects of Indemnity Practice:A Practical View for CaliforniaLawyers 26 STAN.
L. REv. 577 (1974).
45. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988).
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factual situation calls equitably for shifting the burden of judgment.
For example, if a teenager in a motorcycle race sues the sponsors of
the race for his injuries, the sponsors can sue the teenager's parents
for indemnity, and they would receive partial indemnity in a percentage
equal to the percentage of comparative fault adjudged against the
parents. 46 Comparative equitable indemnification can range from total
indemnification to partial indemnification to no right to any indemnification.

47

A potential indemnitee may assert a claim for indemnity in two
ways. First, he may initiate a new action upon completion of the
action against him which gave rise to his claim for indemnity. Alternatively, he may assert his claim by way of cross-complaint prior to
a judgment fixing liability upon him. 48 For the purposes of employment
lawsuits, three types of indemnity are more prevalent: Express contractual indemnity (the type of indemnity provided by insurance policies), noncontractual implied indemnity (the type of indemnity arising
because of the employer-employee relationship), and indemnity mandated by law (the type of indemnity provided under Labor Code
section 2802 and Corporations Code section 317). 49
A.

Advancement of Fees

California Corporations Code section 317(f) permits corporations to
advance money to individual defendants to cover expenses incurred in
defending any proceeding upon a receipt of an undertaking by or on
behalf of the individual defendant.5 0 While the California Corporations
Code is silent as to what is meant by an undertaking, California Code
of Civil Procedure section 995.190 defines undertaking as "a surety,

46. The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986 ("Proposition 51") may have some impact on
partial comparative indemnity, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this article. See CAL.
CrV. CODE §§ 1430-1432 (Vest Supp. 1988).
47. Recently, the California Supreme Court in Far West Financial Corp. v. D&S Co.,
Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1988), noted: "[Clomparative equitable
indemnity includes the entire range of possible apportionments, from no right to any indemnity
to a right of complete indemnity. Total indemnification is just one end of the spectrum of
comparative equitable indemnification." Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 808, 760 P.2d at 407, 251
Cal. Rptr. at 210, citing Standard Pacific of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App.
3d 577, 587-588, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (1986).
48. Daniels, supra note 44 at 581. For a discussion on pleading indemnity actions see 5
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 873 (3d ed. 1985).
49. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West 1971); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 1977 & Supp.
1988).
50. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(0 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
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indemnity, fiduciary, or like undertaking executed by the sureties
alone." 5'

California Civil Procedure Code section 995.210 states that if a
statute provides for an undertaking, a bond that otherwise satisfies

the requirements for an undertaking may be given in its place.52
Moreover, section 995.230 provides, "The beneficiary of a bond given

in an action or proceeding may in writing consent to the bond in an
amount less than the amount required by statute or may waive the
bond." 53 Since this chapter allows for a waiver of bonds, and since
an undertaking can be considered a bond under this chapter, it appears
that the undertaking requirement of California Corporations Code
section 317 can be waived as long as the waiver is in writing.

In sum, for a corporation to advance payment for the legal fees of
an individual defendant, it is necessary for the individual defendant
to sign an undertaking to repay the advanced monies. This undertaking
requirement, however, can be waived in writing by the corporation.

Since most corporations routinely pay for their employees' legal fees,
obtaining a waiver of the undertaking requirement should be pro

forma.5

4

B. Requirement of Indemnification
1.

CorporationsIndemnifying Employees s

Although a corporation may advance the cost of defending a
lawsuit to an individual defendant, California Corporations Code
section 317 carefully delineates in what proceedings 56 an individual
51. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 995.190 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). Section 995.190 is part
of Title 14, Chapter 2, of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Since the California
Corporations Code does not prescribe any rules regarding undertakings, Chapter 2 of Title 14
of the California Code of Civil Procedure is controlling. Section 995.020 states that "[t]he
provisions of [chapter 2] apply to a bond or undertaking executed, filed, posted, furnished,
or otherwise given as security pursuant to any statute of this state, except to the extent the
statute prescribes a different rule or is inconsistent." Id. § 995.020.
52. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 995.210(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
53. Id. § 995.230 (emphasis added).
54. Appendix 0 is an example of a letter to a corporation whereby a corporation waives
the undertaking requirement.
55. See Karasik & Giller, Advising Employers On Indemnifying Their Agents: the Impact
of CorporationsCode Section 317 and Labor Code Section 2802, 11 L. A. LAW., April 1988,
at 26 (discussing indemnification rights).
56. Section 317 defines "proceedings" as "any threatened, pending or completed action
or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative . . . ." CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 317(a) (Vest 1977 & Supp. 1988).
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defendant 7 is ultimately entitled to indemnification. Under section
317(d), a corporation must indemnify an individual defendant if
the individual defendant is successful on the merits in the lawsuit.5 8
If an individual defendant is successful in a lawsuit brought by a
third party but not on the merits, or if an individual defendant loses
the lawsuit but acted in good faith and in a manner such person
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation, the
corporation may indemnify the individual defendant. 9 Furthermore,
if a corporation sues an individual, for example, because the individual acted outside the course and scope of his employment, the
individual would be entitled to indemnification either if he wins the
lawsuit or if he loses the lawsuit but acted in good faith, in a manner
he believed to be in the best interests of the corporation and its
60
shareholders.
When the corporation may indemnify an individual defendant, the
indemnification is permissible only if it is authorized by either: (1) a
majority vote of a quorum consisting of non-interested directors; (2)
if such a quorum of directors is not obtainable, by independent legal
counsel in a written opinion; (3) approval of the shareholders with
the shares owned by the person being indemnified not being entitled
61
to vote; or (4) court order.
California Corporations Code section 317(c) delineates the circumstances under which indemnification of individual defendants is not
permitted:
1. When an individual defendant loses a lawsuit and did not act
in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in the
best interests of the corporation or in a manner he believed to be
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, and
the court in which the proceeding is or was pending did not
determine upon application that the individual is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification;
2. When a case is settled or otherwise disposed of without court

57. Section 317 concerns "agents" and in § 317(a) that term is defined as "any person

who is or was a director, officer, employee, or other agent of the corporation .

. . ."

Id.

58. In American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Schigur, 83 Cal. App. 3d 790, 793-94,
148 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1978), the court held that "successful on the merits" means an actual
judicial determination in favor of the agent on the merits of the case; a mere dismissal with
prejudice would not suffice.
59. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988). In a criminal proceeding the
agent would also have to demonstrate that he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct
was unlawful. Id.
60. Id. § 317(c).
61. Id. § 317(e).
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approval; and
3. When expenses are incurred in defending a pending action
that
62
is settled or otherwise disposed of without court approval.
In most circumstances, a corporation either must or may be entitled
to indemnify individual defendants. In the latter case, indemnification
is permitted if it is authorized, either by the court or by the board
of directors. In the rare circumstance, where the individual defendant
acted in bad faith and not in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, the corporation, while usually prohibited from
indemnifying the individual, could have a duty to indemnify if the
court so orders.
Expanded indemnification obligations may also arise under Corporations Code section 317(g), which allows a corporation to expand
its indemnification rights in its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, or
by agreement. 63 Corporations Code section 204 subparts (10) and (11)
control the expanded indemnification rights. 64 These sections explicitly
prohibit indemnification for circumstances in which indemnity is
expressly prohibited by section 317. Thus, the expansion of indemnification applies only to situations where the corporation may indemnify an individual under Corporations Code section 317.65
Consequently, it would be prudent when commencing litigation involving an individual and a corporate defendant to request from the
corporation a copy of its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.
California Labor Code section 2802 mandates that an employer
shall indemnify his employee for expenses and losses in discharge of
the employee's duties even though the duties were unlawful unless
66
the employee at the time of discharge believed them to be unlawful.
It is conceivable that an employee could be acting in good faith
following the employer's instructions and yet not be acting in a
manner the employee reasonably believed to be in the best interest
of the corporation because the acts were unlawful. In such a situation,
if the employee does not prevail in the lawsuit, the employer/
corporation could not indemnify the employee according to California
Corporations Code section 317(c)(1).

62. Id. § 317(c).
63. Id. § 317(g).
64. Id. § 204 (10)-(11).
65. Section 317(i) allows a corporation to purchase insurance on behalf of an agent of
the corporation, and this insurance policy could indemnify an agent for actions for which a
corporation could not indemnify an individual pursuant to section 317(i). Id. § 317(i).
66. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West 1971).
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Even if the employee reasonably believed he was acting in the
corporation's best interest, without appropriate authorization, the
corporation still could not indemnify the employee. In this unlikely
event, the employee, nevertheless, would have a potential remedy
pursuant to Labor Code section 2802, as was held in Douglas v. Los
67
Angeles-Herald Examiner.
In Douglas, a newspaper reporter brought an action against his
former employer for indemnity and for attorneys' fees and costs
incurred by him in defense of a tort action based on articles written
by him. The court held, "We have no doubt that Labor Code section
2802 requires an employer to defend or indemnify an employee who
is sued by third persons for conduct in the course and scope of his
employment.' '68 The court concluded that the employee was entitled
to indemnification because the acts were performed for, at the
direction of, and with the authorization, ratification, and approval
of the employer. 69 Thus, even if an employee would not be entitled
to indemnification under California Corporations Code section 317,
he still might have a claim under Labor Code section 2802. This is
especially true when an employer is not a corporation since California
Corporation Code section 317 would be inapplicable.
2.

Employees Indemnifying Corporations7o

Besides corporations indemnifying individuals, there are circumstances where the converse can occur. In Davidson v. Welsh, 71 the
court noted, "Therefore, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, the employee, under the principle first enunciated, would
be liable to indemnify his employer for damages the latter suffered
by reason of the former's tortious conduct toward a third person. ' 72

67. 50 Cal. App. 3d 449, 123 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1975).
68. Douglas, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
69. Id. at 464, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 692. Cf. Davidson v. Welch, 270 Cal. App. 2d 220, 75
Cal. Rptr. 676 (1969) (action appealing denial of indemnification by employer for an intentional
tort inflicted by the employee on a customer in the course of his employment). The employee
argued that the employer should have indemnified him based upon Labor Code section 2802.
The court concluded that the employee would not be entitled to be indemnified because the
employer never expressly ratified or authorized the intentional acts by the employee. Id. at
227, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
70. Employers should be cautious before they sue their employees for indemnification.
Besides potential bad publicity, frivolous indemnity actions could result in sanctions or a
malicious prosecution lawsuit.
71. 270 Cal. App. 2d 220, 75 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1969).
72. Davidson, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 227-28, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
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Thus, where a judgment has been rendered and an employer is
liable for damages occasioned by the unauthorized, negligent acts of
any employee, the employer may recoup its loss in an action for
indemnity against the negligent employee. As Davidson pointed out,
the right to indemnity that arose from the relationship of the parties

may be lost if the corporation is itself guilty of serious wrongful
conduct. This wrongful conduct can take the form of an action such

as negligently hiring the employee, or the more subtle form of
73
authorizing or ratifying the action of the employee.
C. Court Approval of Settlements

1. Employee's Indemnification Rights Against a Corporate
Defendant That Has Settled
If a case is settled without court approval, the individual defendant

is not entitled to indemnification for either the portion of the amount
paid on his behalf for settling the case or for expenses incurred in

defending the pending action.74 Thus, as a common practice, whenever a case is settled where an individual defendant is involved, the

settlement should be submitted to a court for approval.
Although no method is set forth in the Corporations Code for
court approval, a methodology is suggested by Title 11 of the

California Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to releases from and
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 75 California Code of Civil
Procedure section 877.6 sets out a procedure for resolving the issue
of good faith settlements. 76 According to section 877.6, a party must,
by noticed motion, set a hearing to determine whether the settlement

73. Id. at 226-27, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 680-681. See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix
Const. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 428, 296 P.2d 801, 804 (1956) ("[w]here a judgment has been
rendered against an employer for damages occasioned by the unauthorized negligent act of his
employee, the employer may recoup his loss in an action against the negligent employee");
Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal. 2d 159, 173, 231 P.2d 484, 492 (1951) ("[a]n employer who has
been held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior has the right of recoupment against
the negligent employee").
74. CAL. CoR'. CODE §§ 317(c)(2), (3) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
75. Title 11 has no impact on individual defendants who are entitled to indemnification
since section 875(f) states: "This title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing
law, and where one tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another there
shall be no right of contribution between them." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(0 (West 1980
& Supp. 1988).
76. Id. § 877.6.

1989 / Legal Issues Confronting Attorneys

was entered into in good faith. Similarly, an individual defendant
probably should set a noticed motion for a hearing to determine, in
light of California Corporations Code section 317, whether the court
approves of the settlement.
2.

CorporateIndemnification Rights Against an Individual
Defendant Who Has Settled

When an individual defendant settles, the issue arises whether the
corporation ultimately can sue the individual for indemnification. In
Ritter v. Technicolor, Inc. ,7 the court noted:
The release of one tortfeasor "shall discharge the tortfeasor to
whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other
tortfeasors" (§ 877 subd. (b)). But the act "shall not impair any
right of indemnity under existing law, and where one tortfeasor
judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another there shall
be no right of contribution between them" (§ 875(f)), and as to the
master-servant situation, the right of indemnity is specifically reserved (§ 876 subd.,(b)). Thus if plaintiffs surmount their difficulties
and obtain a judgment against Technicolor, that defendant will have
an action over for indemnity as against the agents who have "fully
78
settled and compromised" the action with plaintiffs.
Thus, although an individual defendant settling a case in good faith
cannot be held liable for contribution, 79 the corporate defendant
nevertheless will have a cause of action for indemnification.
The California Supreme Court has, in dicta, addressed this situation for individual defendants and for subsidiary corporations. In
Mesler v. Bragg Management Co.,8° the Court discussed the conflict
between the contribution statute's goal of early and final settlement
of claims with the statute's preservation of indemnity rights for
vicariously liable defendants. The Court noted that the threat of
indemnification could prevent a primarily liable defendant from
settling. The Court concluded that the legislature was aware of this
problem and nevertheless enacted the legislation; therefore, the result
must have been desirable. 8'

77. 27 Cal. App. 3d 152, 103 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1972).
78. Ritter, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 155, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 875(f), 876(b), 877(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 102-104.
80. 39 Cal. 3d 290, 702 P.2d 601, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985).
81. The court specifically stated:
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Since the California Supreme Court did not expressly state that
the indemnification right does not exist and other courts have held
that it does exist, it can be assumed that a corporation that is held
liable for a judgment based on vicarious liability can sue an individual
defendant who has previously settled out of the case. It is unlikely,
however, that the corporation will sue the individual defendant for
indemnity unless to do so would be in the best interest of the
corporation. And as the Supreme Court noted, in most circumstances
the same counsel will be representing both the individual defendant
and the corporation, and the easiest method to avoid these indemnity
issues would be to include both the individual defendant and the
corporation in the settlement agreement.
An argument can be made that the language of California Code
of Civil Procedure section 877.6 would protect an individual settling
in good faith from a claim for indemnification. Section 877.6 provides
that a joint tortfeasor who makes a good faith settlement is protected
from further claims from any other joint tortfeasor for "equitable
comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based
on comparative negligence or comparative fault.' '82
In Mayhugh v. County of Orange,83 Judge McDaniel, in his dissent,
discussed this provision. In Pacific Union v. Superior Court,14 the
court of appeal adopted the dissent in Mayhugh as its opinion;
however, when the Supreme Court denied review on January 16,

A potential problem could arise in vicarious liability situations because the contribution statutes preserve the right of full indemnity. Section 875, subdivision (f),
would seem to permit a secondarily liable defendant that has had judgment entered
against it to seek indemnification from the primary tortfeasor. This threat of
indemnification could keep a primarily liable defendant from settling. This court
has not yet addressed the question whether an employer judgment debtor has a right
to obtain indemnification from an employee who has settled with the plaintiff.
However, to the extent such a right exists, "In light of the clear legislative expression,
we must assume that this contingency was foreseen, and that this result was
felt desirable." Moreover, in the alter ego arena, where the corporations involved
have comparable control, it is unlikely that the parent will sue the subsidiary for
indemnity unless to do so would be in the best interest of both corporations. Finally,
it should be noted that in many cases the parent and subsidiary will be represented
by the same counsel, as is the situation in the case at bar, or by separate counsel
working in close collaboration. Thus the easiest method for avoiding indemnity
problems is to include both corporations in the settlement.
Mesler, 39 Cal. 3d at 305, 702 P.2d at 609-10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52 (citation omitted).

82. CAL.. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
83. 141 Cal. App. 3d 763, 190 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1983).
84. 219 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1985). Pursuant to California Rules of Court sections 976(b) and
976.1. the California Supreme Court has order the Pacific Union case depublished. CAL. R.
CT. 976(b), 976.1 (West Supp. 1988). As a result, the case cannot be cited as authority in
California courts. Id.
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1986, it ordered that the opinion not be published in the official
reports. Nevertheless, the dissent in Mayhugh and the opinion of
Pacific Union are helpful in analyzing why a corporate defendant
would be entitled to indemnification. In Pacific Union, the court
held, "[Clases ... make it clear that partial or comparative indemnity is not the same as the indemnity between a negligent servant
and a solely vicariously liable master, but is instead a common law
principle developed as a means to avoid the earlier no-contribution
rule and to allocate loss between joint tortfeasors."85 Since partial
and comparative indemnity is not the same as the indemnity between
an employer and employee, 86 section 877.6(c) would not act as a bar
87
to an action for indemnification between an employer and employee.
An issue closely related to and often confused with indemnity is
contribution, the subject of the next section.
VIII.

A.

CONTRIBUTION AND RELEASE OF TORTFEASORS

Judgment on the Merits Rendered Jointly Against Two or
More Defendants.

Title 11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure sets forth
contribution rights among joint judgment debtors. 8 Chapter 1 of
Title 11 concerns releases from and contribution among joint
tortfeasors 9 and Chapter 2 concerns contribution among other judgment debtors. 0 In essence, for the purposes of employment cases,
Chapter 1 deals with tort actions and Chapter 2 deals with contract

85. Pacific Union, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 266 (citations omitted).
86. Indemnity between an employer and employee usually takes the form of Noncontractual Implied Indemnity, indemnity that is implied by a special relationship. See supra text
accompanying note 45.
87. Although the California Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
noncontractual implied indemnity rights survive a good faith settlement, the court has recently
held a total equitable indemnity claim is barred by a good faith settlement. See Far West
Financial Corp. v. D&S Co., Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1988).
The court essentially reasoned that in view of the strong policy of favoring settlements, any
other holding would put a damper on good faith settlements. This logic is in direct conflict
with the reasoning in Mesler, however, the court in footnote 10 distinguished Mesler on other
grounds.
88. CAl. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-883 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
89. Id. §§ 875-880.
90. Id. §§ 881-883. California Civil Code section 1432, which discusses
contribution between joint parties, is equally applicable to employment cases and it in essence
creates the same result as title 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See id. § 1432.
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actions. Since an individual defendant is usually not a party to any
alleged employment contract, 9' the problem of contribution in the
employment context is almost always limited to tort cases.
Section 875 of the California Code of Civil Procedure allows for
contribution among two or more defendants in a tort action where
a money judgment has been rendered jointly against them. 92 Section
875(c) provides that contribution may be enforced only after one
tortfeasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has
paid more than his pro rata share thereof. 93 The right to contribution,
however, is limited by sections 875(d) and 875(0: contribution is not
allowed for any tortfeasor who has committed an intentional injury,
and contribution is not allowed where one tortfeasor judgment debtor
is entitled to indemnity from another. 94 Thus, if an individual defendant acted intentionally, that defendant would have no right of
contribution against the corporation. Likewise, if an individual defendant was entitled to indemnity under Corporations Code section
317 or Labor Code section 2802, then there would be no right of
contribution between the individual defendant and the corporation.
If an individual defendant cannot be indemnified under California
Corporations Code section 317 or California Labor Code section
2802, the corporation should seek contribution if the corporation
paid the entire judgment or more than its pro rata share. Section
876(a) states that a pro rata share is determined by dividing the entire
judgment equally among all of the tortfeasor judgment debtors. 95
Where a corporation and an individual are the tortfeasor judgment
debtors, the judgment would be split evenly between the two tortfeasor judgment debtors.
A question arises, however, from the following express language
of section 876(b): "Where one or more persons are held liable solely
for the tort of one of them

. .

. , as in the case of the liability of a

master for the tort of his servant, they shall contribute a single pro
rata share, as to which there may be indemnity between them." 96
This language does not make clear whether the judgment should be
split equally between both defendants or whether it provides that

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
Id. § 875(c).
Id. §§ 875(d), (f).
Id. § 876(a).
Id. § 876(b).
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there is just one judgment between the two. In Pacific Union v.
Superior Court,9 7 the court addressed this problem and held:
The reference to master-servant type situations in subdivision (b) is
merely a clarification of the basic rule set out in subdivision (a):
that while pro rata shares serve to distribute loss equally among
joint tortfeasors via contribution, as between a negligent servant
and a vicariously liable master, there is only one tortious act, and
the master-servant unit is therefore liable for only one pro rata
share, as to which there is no contribution but instead a right of
indemnity. 98
In contrast, Mizirawi v. Hol 9 involved an employee who made
fraudulent representations that resulted in liability for himself and
the corporation, his employer. The court declared that the employer's
liability was vicarious; therefore, it was proper for the employee to
pay contribution to the employer.1°°
Ultimately, Mizirawi held that there were four joint tortfeasors,
the corporation and individual defendant being two among the four,
and ordered that since the corporation paid for the individual's
portion of the judgment, the individual would be liable for onefourth of the total judgment entered. 0 1 Thus, under Mizirawi, if the
corporation sues an individual for contribution because the vicariously liable corporation has paid the individual defendant's underlying liability for the judgment, the individual defendant will be liable
for his pro rata share, as that term is defined in California Code of
Civil Procedure section 876(a).
While Mizirawi is still good law and the opinion in Pacific Union
was withdrawn, the reasoning in Pacific Union is more compelling.
Mizirawi's approach makes section 876(b) unnecessary. Pacific Union, however, properly acknowledges the difference when liability is

97. 219 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1985). Pursuant to California Rules of Court sections 976(b) and
976.1, the California Supreme Court has order the Pacific Union case depublished. CAL. R.
CT. 976(b), 976.1 (West Supp. 1988). As a result, the case cannot be cited as authority in
California courts. Id.
98. Pacific Union, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (emphasis in original).
99. 135 Cal. App. 3d 322, 185 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1982).
100. The court specifically held:
In the instant case it is clear from the record that the appellant, Richard E. Holl,
was the individual who made the representations which resulted in liability for
himself and respondent, Baldwin & Howell, in his capacity as an employee of the
latter. The liability of Baldwin & Howell was, therefore, vicarious and less culpable
in character. Applying section 875, subdivision (b) ... it was entirely proper to
require contribution to be paid by appellant.
Mizirawi, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 330.

101. Id.
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vicarious; therefore, its holding seems to be a better approach. Only
in the rare instance where no indemnification rights exist between an
employee and a corporate employer should a corporation be entitled
to a right of contribution.
If the corporation chooses to sue for contribution, then the procedure is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 878, which in
essence requires a noticed motion and entry of judgment. In the
unlikely event that the individual paid the corporation's portion of
the judgment, then assuming that the individual had not committed
an intentional injury and that the individual and the corporation
were not entitled to indemnification, the individual would be entitled
to contribution.
B.

Settlement And Release Before Judgment

When a corporation enters into a settlement agreement in an action
involving an individual defendant, two main concerns regarding
contribution arise.' ° First, under California Corporations Code sections 317(c)(2) and 317(c)(3), if the settlement is not court approved,
the individual defendant is not entitled to indemnification1 03 and the
corporation should sue the individual defendant for contribution.
Second, if the corporation or individual settles for only itself or
himself and not for the other party, the settling party could be liable
for contribution unless pursuant to California Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 the settling party obtains a determination from
a court that the settlement was entered into in good faith.t1
Under section 877, if a corporation signs a release in good faith,
the release discharges the corporation from all liability for any
contribution to the individual defendant. ' 0 Section 877.6 sets out the
specific procedures for determining if a settlement is entered into in
good faith. 1 6 Section 877.6 applies to both contract and tort causes
of action, and the hearing on the issue of good faith must be set by
a noticed motion. Section 877.6(c) further states that if the settlement
was made in good faith, it shall bar any claim for contribution.

102. See supra text accompanying notes 74-86 (discussing indemnification concerns when
a case is settled).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
105. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988)
106. Id. § 877.6.
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IX.

CONCLUSION

The presence of an individual defendant creates many problems
that do not normally exist in wrongful termination lawsuits involving
corporate defendants only. In sum, the following outline'0 7 is offered
as a quick issue reminder when individual defendants are named in
a complaint:
1. A written fee arrangement is necessary or the individual must
waive the written fee agreement (see Appendices A and B);
2. A written consent for potential conflicts of interest must be
obtained (see Appendices C and D);
3. If an actual conflict of interest arises, the attorney must withdraw
from representing all clients;
4. A tender should be made to the corporation's Directors and
Officers Insurance Policy and to the individual's Homeowner's
Insurance Policy (see Appendix E);
5. Demurrers and other pre-trial procedural devices should be
implemented to dismiss individual defendants;
6. Each defendant should propound its own discovery requests if it
is necessary to expand discovery rights;
7. The individual must give an undertaking to his corporate employer
for advancement of attorney fees, or the corporation must waive
the undertaking requirement (see Appendix G);
8. A request for a copy of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws
of the corporation should be made;
9. A complaint or cross-complaint for indemnification must be filed
if a party wishes to pursue its indemnification rights;
10. Any settlement for both an individual defendant and a corporate
defendant should be court approved;
11. If one of the defendants settles, that defendant should seek a
court order of good faith settlement; and
12. If indemnification is not permitted, a corporation may have a
duty to sue for contribution; and an individual may have the right
to sue for contribution.
This outline, combined with the checklist, chart, and sample letters,
hopefully will be of assistance when litigating lawsuits where individuals are named as defendants in the complaint.
In the sea of employment litigation that is flooding our court's
dockets, employees are no longer focusing their attacks on the

107.

See Appendix H for a checklist of these items.
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Gibraltars of employment, the employer itself. Instead, the tentacles

of litigation are spreading out towards the Archipelagos of employment, the individual employees. Thus, defense attorneys face new

procedural and tactical battles in the ongoing struggles between
employees and employers.
X.

APPENDICES'0 8

108. The author of this article makes no representation of any kind, express or implied,
concerning the use of any form or letter contained in this appendix.
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APPENDIX A
(213) 688-56
[Name]
[Address]
[City]
Re:

[Case]

Dear [Client]:
The purpose of this letter is to explain my law firm's standard
fee arrangements and billing practices. [Law Firm] will provide legal
services to you on the terms set forth below:
1.

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This writing reflects an agreement for employment ("Agreement")
between [client] (the "[client]") and the [law firm] (the "[law firm]"),
and the promises following represent full and mutual consideration
for the Agreement.
2.

PROMISES OF THE CLIENT
A.
Client's Duties:
You agree to be truthful with us, to cooperate with us, to keep
us informed of developments, to abide by this Agreement, to pay our
bills on time, and to keep us advised of your address, telephone number,
and current whereabouts.
B.
Retainer:
You agree to pay us a retainer of $
by
The retainer will be held in a trust account, and our hourly charges
will be credited against it. You authorize us to use that fund to pay
the fees and other charges you incur.
Whenever your retainer is exhausted, we shall bill you for our services as explained in Sections 3B and 3C of this Agreement. Any unused
portion of the retainer at the conclusion of our services will be refunded.
C. Costs and Other Charges
(1) In general:
We will incur various costs and expenses in performing legal services under this Agreement. You agree to pay for those costs and expenses in addition to the hourly fees. The costs and expenses com-
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monly include process servers' fees, fees fixed by law or assessed by
courts and other agencies, court reporters' fees, long distance telephone
calls, messenger and other delivery fees, postage, parking and other
local travel expenses, photocopying and other reproduction costs, clerical
staff overtime, word processing charges, jury and witness fees, charges
for computer time, and other services and items reasonably necessary
for proper representation of you. We reserve the right to require you
to advance funds necessary to pay specific expenses before they are
incurred or paid.
(2) Out-of-town travel:
You agree to pay transportation, meals, lodging, and all other costs
of any necessary out-of-town travel by our personnel. You will also
be charged the hourly rates for the time legal personnel spend travelling.
(3) Experts, consultants, and investigators:
To aid in the preparation or presentation of your case, it may
become necessary to hire expert witnesses, consultants, or investigators.
We will not hire such persons unless you agree to pay their fees and
charges. We will select any expert witnesses, consultants, or investigators
to be hired.
PROMISES OF THE LAW FIRM
A. Scope Of Services:
You are hiring us as your attorneys to represent you in the matter
described in the attached Rate Schedule. We will take reasonable steps
to keep you informed of progress and to respond to your inquiries.
If a court action is filed, we will represent you through the appeal
process or through execution proceedings.
B. Legal Fees And Billing Practices:
All fees will be billed based upon the time and labor reasonably
required to be devoted to representation of your interest in the matter(s)
listed in the Rate Schedule's Identification section. You agree to pay
by the hour at our prevailing rates for time spent on your matter by
our legal personnel. Our current hourly rates for legal personnel (and
other billing rates) are set forth in the attached Rate Schedule; however,
the Rate Schedule is subject to adjustment after prior written notice
to you.
We will charge you for the time we spend on telephone calls relating
to your matter, including calls with you, opposing counsel, or court
personnel. The legal personnel assigned to your matter will confer among
themselves about the matter, as required. When they do confer, each
person will charge for the time expended. Likewise, if more than one
of our legal personnel attends a meeting, court hearing, or other proceed3.
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ing, each will charge for the time spent. We will charge for waiting
time in court and elsewhere and for travel time, both local and
out-of-town.
C. Billing Statements:
We will send you monthly statements for our fees and any expenses advanced by us. Statements will be rendered as of the - day
of each month, and are due and payable upon receipt. If not paid
within - days after receipt, any unpaid balance will bear interest
at the maximum legal rate until paid. You may request a statement
at intervals of no less than thirty (30) days. If you do, we will provide
one within ten (10) days.
D. Disclaimer Of Guarantee:
Nothing in this Agreement and nothing in our statements to you
will be construed as a promise or guarantee about the outcome of your
matter. We make no such promises or guarantees. Our comments about
the outcome of your matter are expressions of opinion only.
PROMISES OF THE CLIENT AND THE LAW FIRM
A. Discharge And Withdrawal:
You may discharge us at any time. We may withdraw with your
consent or for good cause. Good cause includes your breach of this
Agreement, your failure to follow our advice on a material matter,
or any fact or circumstances that would render our continuing representation unlawful or unethical.
When our services conclude, all unpaid charges will immediately
become due and payable. After our services conclude, we will, upon
your request, deliver your file to you, along with any funds or property
of yours in our possession.
B. Arbitration:
Any disputed controversy between us as to the amount of our fees,
or whether they are reasonably required for representation of you, or
any other matter, shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect.
4.

CONSTRUCTION OF THIS AGREEMENT
A. Choice of Law:
This Agreement is to be construed pursuant to the laws of the
State of California, including California law regarding choice of law.
B. Invalid Agreement Provisions:
Should any provisions of this Agreement become legally unenforceable, no other provision of this Agreement shall be affected, and
5.
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this Agreement shall be construed as if the Agreement had never included the unenforceable provision.
C. No Other Agreements:
This Agreement represents the full agreement between the [client]
and the [law fim], and this Agreement supercedes any other agreements,
oral or written, regarding the employment of [law firm]. In signing
this Agreement, neither the [client] nor the [law firm] rely upon any
promise, representation of fact or law, or other inducement that is
not expressed in this Agreement. This Agreement may be modified only
by written agreement of the [client] and the [law firm] and may not
be modified by any oral agreement.
D. Practices Inconsistent With This Agreement:
No provision of this Agreement shall be modified or construed
by any practice that is inconsistent with such provision, and failure,
by either the [client] or the [law firm] to comply with any provision,
or to require the other to comply with any provision, shall not affect
the rights of either to thereafter comply or require the other to comply.
6.

EFFECTIVE DATE:
This Agreement shall be effective on the date signed by [client]
and [law firm], and if those signatures are on different dates, the effective date of this Agreement shall be the latest of those dates. Even
if this Agreement does not take effect, you will be obligated to pay
us the reasonable value of any services we may have performed for you.
Sincerely,
David M. Lester for
[Law Firm]
I/We have read and understood the foregoing terms and those set
forth in the attached Rate Schedule and agree to them, as of the date
[law firm] first provided services. If more than one party signs below,
we each agree to be liable, jointly and severally, for all obligations
under this Agreement.
[Client]
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RATE SCHEDULE
A.

Identification:
Client:
Matter:

v.

B.

Hourly Rates for
Senior Partners:
Partners:
Associates:
Paralegals:
Law Clerks:

C.

Standard Charges:
We charge for our time in minimum units of_

Legal Personnel :
$
per hour.
$
per hour.
$
per hour.
$
per hour.
$
per hour.

hours.

D.

COSTS AND EXPENSES:
In-office photocopying
- per page.
Mileage
__
per mile.
Computerized legal research
- per hour.
Word Processing
- per hour.
Other computer time
__
per hour.
Clerical staff overtime will be charged at 1.5 times the base hourly
rate or at the rates required by applicable law, whichever is greater.
The base hourly rates for clerical personnel presently range between
$_
and $__
E.

SUBJECT TO CHANGE:
The rates in this schedule are subject to change on
days written
notice. If you decline to pay any increased rates, we will have the right
to withdraw as your lawyers.
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APPENDIX B
[Date]
(213) 688-56
[Name]
[Address]

Re:

[Case]

Dear [Individual Client]:
My law firm, with your consent, has undertaken to represent you,
an individual defendant, in the above-referenced litigation. I am writing
to explain the payment of legal fees to my law firm. California Business
and Professions Code Section 6148 requires us to have a written fee
agreement with all of our non-corporate clients unless the client knowingly, and in writing, states that a written agreement concerning fees
is not required.
According to Section 6148, a fee agreement is required when the
total expenses to a client will likely exceed One Thousand Dollars
($1,000). If a fee agreement is required, it must be in writing and must
contain the following provisions:
1. The hourly rate and other standard rates, fees, and charges
applicable to the case;
2. The general nature of the legal services to be provided to the
client; and
3. The respective responsibilities of the attorney and the client
as to the performance of the agreement.
Since [Employer] has undertaken the responsibility for payment
of fees on your behalf, I believe a written fee arrangement with you
is not necessary. Consequently, if you are willing to waive the requirement of a written fee arrangement, please sign this letter and return
it to me in the enclosed, preaddressed, stamped envelope. In the meantime, we will continue to represent you in connection with the referenced
matter. If you prefer a fee arrangement letter, please notify me and
I will gladly send you one.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, or if, at any time,
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you have any questions regarding this litigation, please do not hesitate
to telephone me. We appreciate the opportunity to represent you in
this matter.
Sincerely,
David M. Lester for
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ
The undersigned acknowledges that he has been made aware of
the existence of California Business & Professions Code Section 6148
and its provisions, and fully understanding its provisions, the undersigned knowingly states that no written fee agreement is necessary.
Dated:

[Name]
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APPENDIX C
[Date]
(213) 688-56
[Name]
[Address]

Re:

[Case]

Dear [Individual Client]:
[Employer] has requested my law firm to undertake the representation of it and you in the above-referenced litigation. I am writing to
explain potential conflicts of interest that may exist or later develop
between you and [Other Named Defendants] and their effect on our
ability to represent you.
Whenever a law firm represents multiple clients, such as an employer
and its employees, there always exists a possibility of a conflict of interest. For example, the employer, at some point in the litigation, could
assert that an employee was not acting within the scope of his employment. Because of this potential, it is necessary for you to consent in
writing to our representation of all the named defendants in this action. If you are willing to waive the potential conflicts between you
and [Other Named Defendants], please sign this letter and return it to
me in the enclosed, preaddressed, stamped envelope.
If you decide not to sign this waiver, my law firm will be unable
to represent you and you will need to find your own attorney. Even
if you do sign this waiver, should an actual conflict develop, my law
firm will have to withdraw from its representation of both you and
[Employer]. At present, however, we are not aware of any actual conflict between you and the other defendants.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, or if, at any time,
you have any questions regarding this litigation, please do not hesitate
to telephone me. We appreciate the opportunity to represent you in
this matter.
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Sincerely,
David M. Lester for
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ
The undersigned understands that a potential conflict of interest
exists between him and the other defendants, and nevertheless, he consents to Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz's representation of himself and
each of the other named defendants in the above-captioned action.
Dated:

[Name]
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APPENDIX D
[Date]
(213) 688-56
[Name]
[Address]

Re:

[Case]

Dear [Employer]:
You have requested my law firm to undertake the representation
of [Individual Defendant]. I am writing to explain potential conflicts
of interest that may exist or later develop between [Employer] and
[Other Named Defendants] and their effect on our ability to represent
[Individual Defendant].
Whenever a law firm represents multiple clients, such as an employer
and its employees, there always exists a possibility of a conflict of interest. For example, the employer, at some point in the litigation, could
assert that an employee was not acting within the scope of his employment. Because of this potential, it is necessary for [Employer] to consent
in writing to our representation of all the named defendants in this
action. If [Employer] is willing to waive the potential conflicts between
it and [Other Named Defendants], please sign this letter and return
it to me in the enclosed, preaddressed, stamped envelope.
If [Employer] decides not to sign this waiver, my law firm will
be unable to undertake the representation of [Individual Defendant]
and he will need to find his own attorney. Even if you do sign this
waiver, should an actual conflict develop, my law firm will have to
withdraw from its representation of [Employer] and [Individual
Defendant]. At present, however, we are not aware of any actual conflict between [Employer] and [Other Named Defendants].
If you have any questions regarding this letter, or if, at any time,
you have any questions regarding this litigation, please do not hesitate
to telephone me.
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Sincerely,
David M. Lester for
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ
The undersigned understands that a potential conflict of interest
exists between [Employer] and the other defendants, and nevertheless,
it consents to Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz's representation of it and
each of the other defendants in the above-captioned action.
Dated:

[Name].
for

[Employer]
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APPENDIX E
[Date]
(213) 688-56_
[Agent's Name]
[Agency]
[Address]
Re:

[Case Name]
[Insurance Company] Homeowner's Policy
[Policy No.]
[Our File No.]

Dear [Agent]:
This law firm is representing the named defendants in the case
of [Case Name], Los Angeles County Superior Court, [Case No.],
pending in the Central District of the above-mentioned court. In order
to provide you with information regarding this case, I am enclosing
a copy of the Complaint filed with the court on [Date].
On behalf of the insureds, I am tendering this claim upon you
as the agent for the aforementioned policy. This claim is being tendered
for purposes of costs of defense, as well as indemnity. As such, I request that you notify the appropriate claims services and provide them
with a copy of the enclosed Complaint.
Please send me copies of any correspondence you have with the
insurance company regarding this matter, and direct any questions,
requests, or other communications to this office.
Sincerely,
David M. Lester for
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ
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APPENDIX G
[Date]
(213) 688-56_____
[Name]
[Address]

Re:

[Case]

Dear [Employer]:
You have requested my law firm to undertake the representation
of [Individual Defendant]. I am writing to explain the procedure for
advancing [Individual Defendant]'s legal fees.
California Corporations Code Section 317(f) allows a corporation
to advance expenses to an agent, such as [Individual Defendant], incurred in defending an action if the agent signs an undertaking to repay
the costs of defense should it be determined ultimately that the agent
is not entitled to indemnification. This undertaking requirement,
however, can be waived. Since you have indicated your willingness to
pay for [Individual Defendant]'s legal fees, please review the waiver
language at the end of this letter. If it is acceptable, please sign this
letter and return it to me in the enclosed, preaddressed, stamped
envelope.
If you have any questions regarding this letter, or if, at any time,
you have any questions regarding this litigation, please do not hesitate
to telephone me.
Sincerely,
David M. Lester for
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ
The undersigned acknowledges that it has been made aware of the
existence of California Corporations Code Section 317(f), and fully
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understanding that provision, the undersigned knowingly states that
no undertaking from [Individual Defendant(s)] is necessary.

Dated:

[Name]
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APPENDIX H
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT CHECKLIST

Yes

No

Items to Consider
Written Fee Agreement
Written Waiver of Fee Agreement
Letter Waiving Potential Conflicts
Tender Letter to Homeowner Policy
Tender Letter to D & 0 Policy
Letter Waiving Undertaking

Requirement
Letter Requesting Articles of

Incorporation and Bylaws
Demurrer to dismiss individual

defendant(s)
Substitution of Attorneys
Court approval for a settlement
Court determination of good faith

settlement
Complaint or Cross-Complaint for
Indemnification
Motion for Contribution

Date Prepared

